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Abstract 
The paper investigates alternative measures for analysing long-term sustainability of public 
finances under population ageing and presents a method to transform long-term public 
expenditure projections into medium-term budget balance targets. Data on EU-12 (euro 
area) are used as illustrations. 
Firstly, previously used measures are discussed and their implications spelled out. It is 
recognised that according to the prevailing population projections the share of older people 
is moving to a permanently higher level, and that this has consequences on sustainability 
measures and their interpretation. 
Secondly, considerations on intergenerational fairness - based on the fertility and longevity 
of successive generations - are incorporated, leading to a gradual adjustment of fiscal 
parameters. The outcome, given the expenditure projections for EU-12, determines public 
debt reduction and a budget balance surplus of around 1.5% of GDP by 2010 and further, of 
2%, by 2020. This budget balance path can be interpreted as a required target implied by 
the principle of intergenerational fairness, if the underlying expenditure projection is 
accepted as a commitment, or if no policies to deviate from this projection are designed. 
Correspondingly, the framework can be used to discuss pension reforms and other policies 
to help contain ageing-related expenditure, with a view to clarifying the effect of these 
reforms on the corresponding targets for budget balance. 
The paper concludes with data requirements for advancing the debate on pension reforms 
and sustainability of public finances, with the caveat that sufficient data is already available 
to bolster the conviction that reforms should not be delayed.  
 
JEL classification: H1, H5, H6 
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4 
1.  The purpose of this paper and the outline 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse long-term sustainability of public finances under 
population ageing in the light of alternative indicators, and to present a framework to derive 
paths for medium-term budget balance from the long-term public expenditure projections 
made available by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the European Union in 2001.  
The root of the financial sustainability problem is the increase in the EU old age 
dependency ratio (OADR), from 40% to over 70%, between 2005-2050.
1 According to 
EPC data for 2005-2050, pension expenditure will increase in EU-12 by 4.1 percentage 
points of GDP (from 11.5% to 15.6%). Total ageing-related expenditure will increase by 
5.8 percentage points (from 17.6% to 23.4%). Expenditure will increase proportionally far 
less than the old age dependency ratio because the ratio of average pensions to average 
wages in EU-12 is projected to decline by roughly one fifth.
2  
The outline of the paper is as follows: in Chapter 2, after some preliminary remarks, we 
illustrate the previously used measures for sustainability, based on seeking a constant tax 
rate (tax revenues as a % of GDP) necessary for financing the given expenditure over any 
period examined. The budget balance and debt reduction paths implied by this tax rate (or 
mutatis mutandis, by a change in some other public finance item) are spelled out.  
The new features motivating the present paper are introduced in Chapter 3 where the 
restriction that the future tax rate should be constant is relaxed. The underlying economic 
reasoning is that establishing, for each successive age cohort, a link between tax 
contributions and ageing-related public expenditure benefits can be argued as introducing a 
sound economic principle. Namely, an undeniable fact in earnings-related pension systems 
is that, on average, roughly 30 years separate the accrual of pension rights and their use 
(from the average age of a worker to the average age of a pensioner), and within those 30 
years longevity increases. In addition, the number of people in the younger cohorts declines 
due to declined fertility. Given the expenditure projections, these demographic factors 
underpin a new rule determining a gradually increasing tax rate so that intergenerational 
fairness is fulfilled, at least approximately. Again, the results for the budget balance and 
reduction of public debt are illustrated.  
In Chapter 4 the main results in the present paper are compared to those in previous 
literature.  
The emerging budget balance path can be interpreted as a required medium-term target 
implied by the principle of intergenerational fairness, if the underlying expenditure 
projection is accepted as a commitment, or if no policies to deviate from this projection are 
                                                 
1  Here we use the ratio of people aged 60+ to those between 20 and 59 instead of the commonly used 
65+/15-64 –ratio as the age of 60 currently corresponds to the average effective retirement age.  
2  As the present paper is merely methodological, the results below are confined to EU-12, i.e. average 
figures for the current euro area countries rather than presenting the results for each Member State. The 
big differences between them should, however, be kept in mind. - We use EU-12 rather than EU-15 data 
for our illustrations mainly because we primarily have in mind the EU Member States with relatively 
generous public pension systems, mostly based on pure Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) financing, while the 




designed. Consequently, the framework can be used to discuss pension reforms and other 
policies to help contain ageing-related expenditure, with a view to clarifying the effect of 
these reforms on the corresponding budget balance targets. These issues are discussed in 
the concluding Chapter 5, together with a discussion on data requirements for advancing 
the debate on pension reforms and sustainability of public finances. 
The data for EU-12 comes from the public expenditure projections for each euro area 
member, given in the EPC 2001 report, with some minor adjustments presented in their 
2001 Stability Programmes. The assumption for the growth of labour productivity is 1.75% 
p.a. Inflation is assumed at 2%, and the interest rate at 2 percentage points above the rate of 
growth of nominal GDP. In 2004, the initial year of the analysis, public debt is at 57.4% of 
GDP.
3   
The coverage of the present paper is limited, firstly, in that we are not discussing the 
institutional question as to which level of government could use the method presented 
below for budget balance and tax rate target setting, and for designing pension reforms. 
Under the rules for the European Union the competence for securing sound public finances 
is shared between Member States and the EU Council of finance ministers (ECOFIN), 
which, in this area, acts on the recommendations of the European Commission. The 
considerations of long-term sustainability of public finances have recently gained 
importance, and the method presented below could provide additional input.  
Secondly, following the line of research in this area, the analysis only looks into public 
finances, and therefore excludes any feedback effects from the (alternative) tax rate paths 
on expenditure figures. One justification for this is that the increase in the tax rate resulting 
from the scenarios could be substituted by an identical decrease in non-ageing-related 
expenditure, in which case the potential feedback effects could be different. Some other 
aspects related to the robustness of the results are further discussed below. 
Thirdly, the partial analysis provides a basis for useful first approximations which, 
appropriately modified, could serve as inputs to a larger macroeconometric model for 
simulating the effects of alternative fiscal policy rules under ageing populations. 
 
                                                 
3   This figure represents gross public debt in EU-12 with the minor exception of Finland where net debt 
enters the calculation due to the considerable assets held by the general government as it includes 
mandatory occupational pension funds. The conventional practise to use the gross debt figures for the 
other EU-12 countries is followed here as assets held by the public sector are small in most countries. In 
further analysis it should be kept in mind that it is rather net debt which matters for the issues here. Gross 
debt and gross asset figures should be looked at separately as necessary.  
6 
2.  Previous indicators of the sustainability of public finances 
The increase in ageing-related expenditure as such is a measure of the challenge posed by 
ageing on the sustainability of public finances. This, added to the projected non-ageing-
related expenditure which is assumed to be maintained at its initial level, is depicted for 
EU-12 in Figure 1, uppermost graph.  
One financially sustainable option is to increase the tax rate in tandem with the increasing 
expenditure so that the public debt ratio remains constant throughout the period. Another, 
more ambitious option is to maintain the budget balance at zero at each point in time. The 
latter scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.  
A simple example of an unsustainable path is based on the assumption of maintaining the 
2005 tax rate given in the 2001 Stability Programmes (rendering a close-to-zero budget 
balance in 2005). Figure 1 shows how public debt declines and the budget balance fulfils, 
with a small surplus, the ‘close to balance’ rule until around 2020. After that, as 
expenditure starts to increase more rapidly, the deficit grows and debt explodes. This is 
clearly an unsustainable path. One indicator emerging from this scenario is the level of debt 
in 2050: 91% of GDP.  
Constant tax rate for sustainability until 2050 
A well-established methodology takes the so-called Present Value Budget Constraint 
(PVBC) as the conceptual basis for defining and testing the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. It states that the present value of government revenue must be equal to 
present value of expenditure (without interest payments) plus initial public debt. 
Alternatively, if the time horizon is finite, the present value of the difference between 
revenue and expenditure must be equal to the difference between initial debt and the 
present value of terminal debt.  
The first set of conventionally used scenarios looks into a fixed time period, i.e. until 2050, 
given by terminal year of the projections available. In this case, to derive a result for the tax 
rate which would fulfil the PVBC requires some additional restrictions. It is common that 
the end of period debt ratio is set by assumption or some rule such as the debt ratio in the 
beginning of the period (i.e. currently), for example. Alternatively, following previous 
studies, the terminal value for the debt ratio can be set as equal to the one which would 
emerge from the path with zero budget balance throughout the period.
4 For EU-12, which 
has a debt ratio of 57% in 2005, the result for 2050 is 11.5% (57% divided by 4.8, as the 
projected nominal GDP in 2050 is 4.8 times GDP in 2005).  
The scenario in Figure 1 labelled ZA/05-50 (for zero balance on average in 2005-2050) 
illustrates this option. The constant tax rate for 2005-2050 is about one percentage point 
higher than the tax rate in the Stability Programmes, rendering faster reduction in debt and 
a budget surplus of nearly 2% of GDP until 2020. The U-shape of the debt path means, 
however, that it would not be financially sustainable as debt first reduces below zero, and 
then again starts to grow without limit. As this is the outcome for EU-12 average, for many 
Member States this method produces an even faster debt explosion. 
                                                 
4    An indicator based on this assumption is found in European Commission (2002a), Chapter 4. It is 
inspired by the ‘close-to-balance of surplus’ –rule of the Stability and Growth Pact.  
7 
Figure 1.   EU-12 public finances under alternative tax rates: Zero Budget Balance  
(ZBB tax), Stability Programmes (SP tax) and ZBB on average 2005-50 (ZA/05-50 tax) 
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* ratio of population aged over 60 years to those aged 20-59 years.  
Source: Eurostat projection 
 
 
Constant tax rate for infinite future 
The alternative approach of setting an infinite time period naturally requires that an 
assumption be made on the path of public expenditure from 2050 onwards. Fortunately, this 
can be done on clearly identifiable grounds based to population dynamics. The prevailing 
demographic projections for the EU are, roughly speaking, based on two key assumptions: 
fertility remains constant at the current average of 1.7 children per woman, and longevity 
increases by five years until 2050 and then remains constant. It is also assumed that net 
migration settles at some fixed proportion of population. Figure 2 depicts the projection for 
the old age dependency ratio, which illustrates that the change in the age structure of the 
population, i.e. population ageing, is roughly completed by 2050. Naturally, if the 
demographic factors change, another stable age structure emerges, with a different public 
expenditure projection, which can then be used as a starting point for a similar exercise. 
This approach firstly helps to make a distinction between the process of population ageing, 
i.e. the increase in the OADR, and the characteristics of the (hypothetically) emerging 
stable age structure. Secondly, the demographic projection lays the basis for a projection on 
ageing-related public expenditure, driven by the rules of the pension system and any factors 
determining other ageing-related expenditure. An assumption that all relevant variables 
have settled to their terminal values by 2050, and that public expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP therefore remains constant thereafter, provides a methodological anchor for deriving  
9 
alternative financing rules which secure sustainability as long as the underlying 
assumptions on demographic development and ageing-related public expenditure are valid.
5  
Combining the assumptions for public expenditure over the infinite time horizon and the 
requirement that the PVBC be fulfilled, a constant tax rate from day one of the exercise to 
infinity can be derived. Here, no assumption on the debt at any point in time (or on its path) 
is required. Instead, the path for the debt is an outcome of the expenditure projection and 
the assumed fiscal rule.  
The result is depicted in Figure 3. The debt ratio declines to zero around 2020 and 
converges to minus 31%, i.e. debt decreases by 88%. The budget balance jumps to 2% of 
GDP, increases thereafter and stays above 3% until 2020.  
The implied budget surplus and debt reduction should not necessarily be regarded as a 
recommended policy line, notably in cases where the resulting budget surplus is higher than 
for the EU-12. The conclusion could rather be that the rules on the expenditure side should 
be revised to arrive at a lower expenditure increase, and hence to lower budget surplus 
targets and debt reduction. In addition, the rule implying a constant tax rate can be 
questioned and an alternative rule implying a gradual adjustment of the tax rate can be 
argued. This is the issue in the next Chapter. 
                                                 
5   While using this approach we should keep in mind that the accuracy of extending the demographic 
projection beyond 2050 by a simple assumption should be verified. Depending on the initial age 
structure of the population in each country, it might either over- or under-estimate the emerging OADR, 
but not dramatically. Yet, for the EU as a whole, a simple assumption might be a good first 
approximation. - It should be noted that although in the Eurostat projections, for some Member States 
the OADR (old age dependency ratio) decreases somewhat during the 2040s (not shown here), it would 
not necessarily decline further after 2050. It represents a consequence of the baby-boom generations’ 
passing away, and it is possible that the OADR will increase after 2050, as the full effects of the current 
low fertility will only materialise with a long lag. 
  
10 
Figure 3.   EU-12 public finances under alternative tax rates: ZBB on average 2005-50 
        (ZA/05-50 tax) and constant tax rate for infinite horizon (Constant tax) 
















































































































3.  Intergenerational fairness as a basis for gradual adjustment 
Assuming a constant tax rate which secures sustainability is often presented as an option 
which, under the given expenditure increase, minimises the efficiency loss caused by tax 
distortion. However, accepting it as an overriding norm or policy advice is far from self-
evident. 
Instead, recognising that the increase in public expenditure is mostly caused by declined 
fertility and increasing longevity and that the successive age cohorts differ from each other 
in these respects, it can be argued that these factors should be taken into account in setting 
the tax rate for each generation. Although the result is only an approximation, this can be 
done by extending the argument presented by Oksanen (2002), inspired by Sinn (2000), for 
implementing intergenerational fairness by moving to partial funding in pension systems.  
We see from Figure 4 that fertility has steadily declined since 1970. Following the Eurostat 
projections we assume that fertility stays at its current level of 1.7 children per woman.
6 
Longevity is assumed to increase by one year in each 10-year period up until 2050 and 
remain constant thereafter. These demographic assumptions generate a time path for the old 
age dependency ratio which converges to a constant, and as seen from Figure 2 above, the 
Eurostat projection follows this shape.  
The first argument is that an age cohort with a declined fertility should pay correspondingly 
more to the pension system, as otherwise, in the case where, for example, payments are 
increased only much later when ageing public ageing-related expenditure increases, future 
generations would be obliged to bear the consequences.  
A parallel argument can be developed for the projected increase in longevity up until 2050.  
If current workers live and enjoy retirement for more years than current pensioners, then 
fairness dictates that the former should pay more into the system than the sum currently 
paid out.  If not, they leave an increasing burden to future generations.  
These arguments are expressed in terms of adjusting the pension system, but as public 
pension systems are part of the general government finances, they can be applied to the 
overall tax rate, given the projected ageing-related expenditure. We can, however, only 
arrive at an approximation as under the prevailing demographic transition, accurate fairness 
would, at each point in time, require different tax rates for different age cohorts depending 
on their demographic characteristics. As this is not envisaged, the result only implements, 
at each point in time, the principle of fairness for all working-age cohorts on average.  
                                                 
6   We refer to ‘completed fertility’, the number of children the average woman gives birth to. ‘Total 
fertility’ is a parallel measure, the ratio of births to women of fertile age in a given year. It is affected by 
‘completed fertility’ and the increase in the average age of woman at childbirth – the latter factor 
explaining why ‘total fertility’ has been lower than ‘completed fertility’ since the 1970s. According to 
Figure 2 ‘completed fertility’ may have declined still further, as the most recent estimate is 1.65.  
12 



























* number of births in a given year per number of women, weighted by age-specific fertility rates of  the 
respective calendar year, 1970-2001 
** number of children by birth year of the mother, 1940-1965 
The two times scales overlap by 30 years reflecting the average childbearing age. 
 
These factors combined imply a rule of thumb that the tax rate should reach the permanent 
level in 2020. As for the path of adjustment, we do not prescribe any retroactive payments, 
yet for 2005 - the hypothetical implementation date of the new rule - a jump in the tax rate 
is introduced, such that it catches up to the level which it would have reached had the rule 
been followed in the past. This jump in 2005 covers 2/3 of the total increase as compared to 
the hypothetical case where population ageing would not take place (this is a tax rate which 
would maintain the debt level of 2004). 
In addition, there is an issue about health and long-term care expenditure, which differs 
slightly from pensions because the projected increase therein is not only benefiting 
pensioners, but also younger cohorts. Therefore, we introduce a rule of thumb that 2/3 of 
this increase should be treated in parallel with pension expenditure, applying the principle 
that while still of working age, each generation should cover in advance the ageing-related 
increase in this expenditure. Thus, 1/3 of the increase is financed from current taxes, 
implying a gradually increasing tax component over the whole period 2005-2050. While 
once again the rule is simple, it serves as a reminder of the underlying issue. 
Introducing these two gradually increasing components to the tax rate gives the result 
depicted in Figure 5, where we reproduce, for comparison, the result of the constant tax rate 
scenario. The debt level decreases now by 70% of GDP, 20 percentage points less than in 
the constant tax scenario. For budget balance the difference is more notable: in the new 
scenario it is 0.3% in 2005, instead of 1.8% with the constant tax, and in the range of 1.5-
2% of GDP over 2010-2020 instead of around 3%. 
  
13 
Figure 5.   EU-12 public finances under alternative tax rates: constant and 
        gradually changing tax rate for infinite horizon 












































































































The effects of the level of initial debt  
The method followed above produces important results with regard to the effect of the 
initial debt. These are illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts, in addition to the base case of 
the 57% initial debt ratio, another hypothetical case of initial debt of 20%.
7 
Firstly and naturally, the required tax rate (and therefore the primary balance) is lower in 
the case with lower initial debt, by a factor which depends only on initial debt and the 
interest rate. Secondly, the reduction of debt is the same in both cases. Thirdly, in parallel 
with the identical reduction of debt, the shape of the path for budget balance is the same, 
with only its level depending on initial debt. 
Figure 6 also illustrates the important result that in the case of lower initial debt the 
emerging path for the budget balance is higher. So, for instance, in a given country where, 
in the past, accumulation of pension funds within the public sector has led to a relatively 
low public net debt, budget balance should also in future be higher than in another which 
has followed a lax fiscal policy line and accumulated debt. This may first look paradoxical 
indeed, and requires an explanation. 
To gear the mind for understanding the result, it is useful to assume no population ageing 
and consider a very simple case where public expenditure is a constant proportion of GDP. 
Rolling over the public debt, whatever it initially happens to be, is a clear case where the 
current and future generations (of equal size) share the burden of debt equally. Assume, for 
example that nominal GDP grows by 4% p.a. If initial debt is 57% of GDP, the budget 
deficit that keeps it constant is 2.2% of GDP, while for a county with initial debt of 20% it 
is 0.8%.
8 
This result can then be extended for a case where public expenditure increases due to 
population ageing, and a rule is set for the tax rate. Following the conventional assumptions 
in this type of analysis, the increase in the productivity of labour is given (converging to 
1.75% p.a., according to the assumption by the EPC). Under population ageing therefore, 
firstly, the future level of the GDP is lower than in a case without ageing. Thus the ratio of 
the initial public debt to future GDP increases with population ageing, i.e. the burden of the 
initial debt per worker increases. Secondly, we assume here that the rate of interest is at a 
fixed margin above the GDP growth rate, i.e. it declines in line with the lower rate of 
growth. This decline alleviates the debt burden. 
Under the simple assumptions above, these two opposite effects cancel each other out. 
Therefore, the level of the initial debt does not matter for the emerging reduction in the 
debt under the prescribed rule. An algebraic proof for this point is provided in the Annex, 
under certain simplifying assumptions necessary to manage the mathematics. Note, 
however, that the scenarios in Figure 6 illustrated here indicate that this result holds more 
generally.  
                                                 
7   Note that the results in this section are illustrated and explained for the scenarios with the gradual tax 
rate, but they would also hold for the constant tax rate scenarios with an infinite time horizon describes 
in the previous Chapter. 
8   To help here: budget deficit is by definition equal to the change in the stock of debt; thus, to maintain the 
debt to GDP ratio in a growing economy, the deficit must be the larger the more indebted the country. 
Note also that it is the rate of growth of nominal GDP that determines this.   
15 
Figure 6.   EU-12 public finances under gradually changing tax rate  
        with initial debt 57% or 20% of GDP 













































































































The budget surplus paths which produce the identical debt reduction differ from each other 
by a constant margin determined by the initial debt positions and the margin between 
interest rate and GDP growth rate. This difference, 1.4% of GDP, is the same as that in the 
simple case where we assumed no population ageing.
9 
Sensitivity of the results to various assumptions  
As stated in the Introduction, the line of research followed here relies on a partial method in 
the sense that the public expenditure projections are taken as given, and any possible 
effects from the alternative tax rates on these figures are excluded. Note, however, that the 
main results are not affected even if the tax rates affect GDP as long as they do not affect 
projections for public expenditure as a percentage of GDP: if average pension as a 
percentage of average wages is not affected by the tax rate (fixed, for example, by an 
indexation rule) and if the share of the wage bill of the GDP is also given, then the 
feedback effect from taxes to GDP would not affect the results. Thus, the above 
assumptions lead to a useful approximation, while further precision could always be 
acquired by constructing alternative projections for public expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP under refined sets of assumptions. 
Similarly, the results above may to some extent depend on base line projections on real 
GDP growth and inflation. Again, however, if the projections for public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP are not affected by these factors, the same holds for the result for debt 
reduction. Budget balance is slightly affected as nominal growth of GDP is always one of 
its determining factors.  
The sensitivity of the results to the assumption on the interest rate can easily be tested. 
There are two possible deviations from the assumption that it is at a constant two 
percentage points above the rate of growth of nominal GDP: this margin can be another 
constant, or it may change in the course of ageing. The latter option could be argued on the 
basis of an open economy: ageing in one country may reduce the GDP growth rate, but as 
financial markets are integrated with the rest of the world and ageing may proceed at a 
slower pace elsewhere, the interest rate may decline less than the GDP growth.  
A scenario for EU-12, assuming an interest rate margin of one percentage point, gives a 
result that ultimate debt reduction is 7% of GDP higher (net assets 19% instead of 12%) 
than with the 2% margin. This effect is so small because the lower interest rate initially 
makes servicing the public debt cheaper, but later affects public finances negatively as 
interest earned on net assets is lower. The difference between the corresponding tax rates is 
negligible: with an interest margin of one the tax rate is 0.05 percentage points higher. The 
biggest difference the interest rate assumption makes is on budget balance: in the early 
years the surplus is 0.4 percentage points higher, diminishing thereafter to 0.2. 
As these results concern the EU-12 average, the sensitivity of the results is higher for a 
Member State with either a considerably higher or lower initial debt. A change in the 
interest rate margin would also have an effect, though relatively small as compared to the 
main substance here, which is the accuracy of the projections for the increase in ageing-
related expenditure.  
 
                                                 
9   Also Buti and Costello (2001, p. 88) illustrate that under a given public finance target a country with 
higher initial debt will have a lower budget balance and a higher primary balance.   
17 
Figure 7.   General government net investment and net saving  
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* EU-15 except EL,E,L and S due to unavailability of data 
Source: European Commission services 
 
 
Thus, the results, though derived from a simple analysis, are relatively robust, assuming 
that the underlying expenditure projections are reliable. 
Missing element: public saving and investment? 
It is clear throughout the present paper that the analysis is strictly limited to total public 
expenditure, and hence omits the distinction between public consumption and investment.  
Net investment added on to capital stock held by the public sector and public expenditure 
for the quality of the environment should certainly be taken into consideration alongside 
public debt or government held financial assets when assessing what one generation leaves 
to the next. However, a look into the recent history of the EU Member States does not 
change the broad picture of intergenerational fairness now, nor for the near future. By their 
tax payments, the generation working from after WWII to the early 1970s supported a level 
of public sector investment that was large enough to increase the public sector capital stock 
as a share of GDP. Since then, public sector net investment has been sliding gradually but 
persistently to a level which hardly maintains the current ratio.
10 Thus, in the span of the 
generation at work from 1975 to date, no public investment has taken place which could 
counterbalance the transfer of a higher pension burden to future generations. We see this 
                                                 
10   Very roughly: if public sector capital stock is of the order of GDP per year, and real GDP grows by 2%, 
then public net investment has to be 2% of GDP to maintain the ratio between public sector capital and 
GDP. According to Figure 7, it has been below this since two decades.  
18 
from Figure 7, which also clearly illustrates that government net saving has been negative 
for more than 20 years since 1975. 
This does not prove what will happen in future, but if it can be assumed that future public 
investment merely maintains the public capital stock to GDP ratio, then it is sufficient for 
intergenerational fairness to look into the financial items - notably into public debt 
reduction. If on the contrary, public investment were to deviate from this benchmark, how 
it should be taken into account would be straightforward: a change in capital stock in 




4.  Comparing the main results with previous literature 
 
Ageing is not only a bubble 
In many previous studies, as well as in the present paper, sustainability of public finances 
has been defined as a set of rules for public expenditure and revenue, such that they can be 
maintained under foreseeable conditions. It was often considered to be sufficient to look 
into a fixed time period and construct a rule for public revenue such that sustainability is 
secured. For example, the work on sustainability indicators published by the OECD in 1990 
concentrated on smoothing tax rates under expenditure fluctuations. The trend-wise, 
persistent increase in expenditure caused by population ageing was hinted at, but as 
estimates were still very vague, the time period considered was restricted and an ad hoc 
assumption of the terminal debt was made to arrive at a benchmark tax rate for 
sustainability (Blanchard, 1990, and Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor, 1990).  
Also, it was still believed 15-20 years ago that the post-WWII baby boom age-cohorts 
merely constituted a temporary population bubble. Under such assumptions, examination of 
a limited time period would have been adequate. However, the population projections for 
the EU Member States and most other countries have, for quite some time, indicated that 
due to persistently declined fertility and increasing longevity, population ageing will lead to 
a permanently high OADR. Ageing of the post-WWII baby boom generation will affect the 
speed of population ageing in the next couple of decades, but according to the prevailing 
projections, the OADR will not decline thereafter, at least not significantly.  
As a useful first approximation therefore, the age structure projected for 2050 can be 
assumed to represent a more distant future, technically speaking the new steady state. This 
projection stems from the assumptions that the current underlying fertility rate is 
maintained, that longevity increases by five years until 2050 and then remains constant, and 
that migration continues at a certain level. These assumptions may turn out to be wrong in 
either direction, but for the purposes of the method and results presented in this paper this 
is not decisive: the current demographic factors should determine the tax rate paid by 
                                                 
11   A parallel question is whether private saving and bequests to children should affect judgement on public 
debt reduction targets? In principle perhaps, as both affect transfers between the generations, but the 
great uncertainty as to what will happen to private saving in future effectively impedes the setting of any 
clear rule for taking this link into account.  It is therefore prudent to respect intergenerational fairness 
within public finances taken alone. Based on declared principles followed for collective bequests, people 
can then choose what to leave privately to their heirs. 
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current generations over the next 15-20 years, and the principles presented here include the 
rule for adjusting fiscal policy whenever the demographic factors are observed or projected 
to deviate from those initially envisaged. 
The projection for the age structure of the population, combined with the prevailing rules 
for ageing-related public expenditure, forms a basis for a public expenditure projection. 
The key feature of this projection is that ageing-related expenditure converges to a constant 
proportion of GDP.  
This makes it possible to by-pass a methodological problem inherent in applying the PVBC 
(Present Value Budget Constraint) for sustainability: as in a dynamically efficient economy 
the interest rate is higher than the GDP growth rate, the PVBC can be fulfilled even in a 
case where the public debt to GDP ratio increases without limit; the PVBC only requires 
that the rate of increase in debt is below the rate of interest. As such a case does not make 
economic sense, an economically meaningful condition for sustainability needs to contain 
some additional restriction, which may vary from one case to another.
12  Here this is taken 
care of by the requirement that public debt (or rather net assets, as we saw in the scenarios 
above) as a proportion of GDP must converge to a constant. 
This operational definition of sustainability and using an iterative method for each scenario, 
allows for any shape of time path for the tax rate until the point in time where the new 
steady state is reached. The scenarios above are based on easily available data and rules of 
thumb on the demographic characteristics of succeeding generations. Any further details 
determining the adjustment path, based on the pension system and its reform in each 
individual country, could be easily incorporated into the scenarios.
13 
From a constant to a gradually increasing tax rate 
Long-term public expenditure projections, extended to infinity, have in many previous 
studies been the objects of exercises to determine, in each case, the constant tax rate 
required for sustainability. Examples are Buiter (1985), Fredriksen (2001) and more 
recently Buiter and Graffe (2002)
14. This is intuitively appealing, relatively simple and 
backed by considerations on tax smoothing for minimising the distortion caused by taxes. 
                                                 
12   See Chalk and Hemming (2000) for a seminal account of using the so-called Present Value Budget 
Constraint (PVBC) as the theoretical basis for public finance sustainability measures. They discuss 
deficiencies in various applications, notably the arbitrariness of restricting the time horizon and the 
terminal debt, though also explaining in a balanced way why, in practice, it is often necessary to make 
various simplifications.  
13   Notably, as the average replacement rate is projected to decline in our data, in constructing the scenarios 
above, we implicitly assume that it goes down smoothly with the same rhythm as demographic 
characteristics of successive generations. This might be a good enough approximation for most EU 
Member States. Italy is, however, a clear exception. Its current rules lead to a projection that pension 
expenditure as a % of GDP, after having increased up until 2030, will nearly fall by back to its current 
level by 2050. This means that even a constant tax rate scenario above is too favourable up until 2030, if 
intergenerational fairness is sought for. Also, in calibrating the gradual adjustment scenarios to 
individual Member States and their potential pension reforms, we should endeavour to use more detailed 
data on the pension benefits of each age cohort and keep an open mind as to how much the results for 
the tax rate should differ from the simple gradual adjustment.  
14   For a review, see Balassone and Franco (2000). The novelty in Frederiksen (2001) is a formula for 
deriving the results from the data on the terminal values for 2050 for ageing-related expenditure in a  
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The illustrations above make explicit the large budget balance surplus and substantial debt 
reduction which the principle of a constant tax rate implies for EU-12 on average under the 
prevailing expenditure projections. To spell out these implications is useful as they make it 
easier to understand the size of the adjustment effort than if we simply depict the difference 
between the required and current tax rates (the tax gap).   
Describing the immediate increase in the tax rate as a required policy change could in 
policy debate be rightly challenged by pointing out that it is not necessarily fair that the full 
burden of the increase in public expenditure should be felt immediately. People may rightly 
question who should pay what and when. This is the motivation for introducing the 
principle of intergenerational fairness to the framework. The application developed here 
illustrates the outcome, albeit recognising its approximate nature. 
The crucial message is that also when the principle of fairness across succeeding 
generations, based on their differing demographic characteristics, is taken into account, 
significant reduction of public debt and marked budget surplus is required. However, the 
time path for the surplus deviates considerably from the one implied by a constant tax rate 
scenario. Allowing a gradual adjustment, this may make the implied policy prescription 
more acceptable. 
Looking into the numbers, debt reduction for EU-12 stemming from the scenario with a 
gradually increasing tax rate is large - 40% of GDP in the first 15 years and up to 70% 
thereafter - eliminating the debt fully and creating a (small) net asset position. However, 
movements of this order of magnitude, albeit in the opposite direction, have recently taken 
place: from 1980 to 1995 public debt in the EU on average rose by 35% of GDP. In any 
event, the framework does not dictate the policy response: the implied debt reduction is a 
consequence of the expenditure projection: reforms for cutting expenditure would lead to 
more modest targets for debt reduction. 
Framing of policies 
For assessing the implications for public debt reduction it is useful to refer to the parallel 
question about the so-called ‘double burden’ of moving towards funding of pensions. 
‘Double burden’ is often used with a negative connotation to mean that under a move to 
funding, current workers pay for both their parents’ pensions and their own. However, 
under ageing population, it is fair to modify the rules of the pension system so that the 
generations which have lower fertility and live longer than their parents, pay into the 
system more than currently goes out. Thus, a benchmark for a certain degree of ‘double 
burden’ can be argued to be fair. 
In a recent extensive survey of pension reforms, Lindbeck and Persson (2003) discuss the 
link between moving to more funding in pension systems and reduction of public debt, 
indicating that this is not yet fully analysed in the literature. They note that “redistribution 
in favour of future generations … can be accomplished by ordinary fiscal measures [i.e. 
measures leading to debt reduction], quite outside the realm of pension reform”. They 
suggest that “pension reform is a way of framing policies that may otherwise be politically 
                                                                                                                                                     
large number of countries. His method is efficient for handling a large data set and provides useful 
approximations for adjusting the fiscal stance for the long term. However, as compared to the method in 
the present paper, his method does not allow taking fully into account the projected time path for 
expenditure from now to 2050, and it is restricted to cases with a constant tax rate.   
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difficult to achieve” (pp. 105-106). This framing may be interpreted in the following way: 
(1) assume that it is accepted as an aim that public sector net debt is reduced in order to 
ease the burden left for future generations; (2) to make it politically acceptable, the rules of 
the public pension system are revised so that, as compared to a pure PAYG system, current 
workers pay in more, leading to accumulation of assets in the pension system, and thereby 
reducing the contributions to be paid in by future generations. Thus, a pension reform 
serves as a rationale for the reduction of public debt. 
The reasoning may also read the other way round: (1) the rules of the public pension 
system are revised in the prescribed way, based on its own purposes and logic, leading to 
accumulation of pension assets; (2) in  this case it is of paramount importance that this 
surplus be entered into the budget balance target for the whole general government sector 
as its purpose would otherwise be eliminated by an opposite change in the other entities of 
the general government. This leakage to more government expenditure or lower taxes 
would occur if the public sector budget balance and debt targets were set independently of 
the pension system reform. 
In the present paper we look neither into the rules of public pension systems nor the 
required changes, but rather take a bird’s-eye view of public finances, producing results for 
budget balance and debt. The framework serves to frame policies while also giving a target 
for debt reduction, conditional on projected ageing-related expenditure and an approximate 
implementation of the principles of intergenerational fairness.
15  
The meaning of initial debt 
One important result is that under conventional assumptions the target for debt reduction 
does not depend on the level of initial debt and that budget surplus should be the higher the 
lower the initial debt. This important yet simple result can be contrasted with the discussion 
on fiscal target setting, where it is common to refer to the challenge of population ageing 
but yet take the view that a country with a lower initial debt position can afford higher 
deficits (this becomes evident from the recent survey by Buti, Eijfinger and Franco, 2003; 
see also European Economic Advisory Group, 2003, Chapter 2). 
This is not to say that the commonly held view that high indebtedness should lead to bigger 
reduction of debt could have other, well-argued grounds. It could be based on an original 
objective of the fiscal rules for the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, namely that 
the Member States which have pursued a lax fiscal policy and have hence accumulated 
debt, should demonstrate their capability to move to sound public finances. Another 
argument could be that the generation which let the public debt accumulate should, as long 
as at least some of them are among the taxpayers, retroactively pay back part of the debt 
and not leave it all to future generations.  
                                                 
15   The recent extensive survey by Feldstein and Liebman (2002) reveals that the basic result that under 
population ageing a pure PAYG system does not produce intergenerational fairness has not received the 
attention it deserves in the light of the unprecedented population ageing in Europe. The case for partial 
funding stemming from the simple analysis under unchanged benefits can be seen in parallel to various 
other, often more refined arguments in favour of more funding and of other pension reforms advocated 
by Feldstein and Liedman (2002) and many others. In the framework of the present analysis partial 
funding is equivalent to reducing public debt, and benefit reforms affect public pension expenditure, 
which drives the results for medium-term budget balance targets.   
22 
These considerations could be legitimate, and could be made concrete and operational, and 
be fed as further adjustment factors into the time path for the tax rate in the gradual tax rate 
scenarios. The framework presented here is perfectly eligible for that. However, it is not at 
all certain that these factors would turn around the basic result that with an ageing 
population, lower initial debt should lead to a higher target for budget balance over the 
medium to long term. Also, this result is consistent with the easily understandable 
proposition that the required tax rate, and therefore also the primary balance, are lower for 
the low debt country.  
Parallel approaches to intergenerational fairness 
In assessing the outcome for debt reduction it is useful to note the link between these 
results and the body of literature looking into the so-called Implicit Pension Debt (IPD) of 
the government, defined as the present value of the accumulated pension rights or of 
projected expenditure, depending on the application. The main thrust of an approach 
building on the IPD is that both the explicit and the implicit pension debt of the public 
sector are carried over to future generations, and therefore both should be dealt with in 
assessing intergenerational fairness and all other economic aspects.  
Looking into the IPD opens up the same questions as any carefully made projection of 
pension expenditure, especially if alternative scenarios are made for pension reform 
options. As soon as a rule or benchmark is set for the total of explicit and implicit public 
debt to be carried over to future generations, the same questions arise as above when setting 
the rule for the gradually increasing tax rate: the time path for the total debt and its 
composition has to be set. The result for EU-12 is the same as here: a drastic change in the 
composition of the total debt as the explicit debt completely disappears. 
Calculations called ‘Generational accounts’ also provide assessments on financial 
sustainability and intergenerational fairness of public policies. Their first purpose is to 
calculate the transfers which the successive age cohorts pay to and receive from the public 
sector. In most cases, current policies are shown to lead to exploding public debt, thus the 
next step of analysis is to change the rules so that sustainability is secured. The adjustment 
can then be either immediate or gradual, and one can calculate the consequences for each 
age cohort (e.g. Kotlikoff, 2002, p. 1905). Thus, the same substantive questions as to how 
the various expenditure items should be attributed to succeeding generations discussed here 
are also to be tackled under the generational account approach. Gearing the ratio between 
expenditure and taxes of each generation to its fertility and longevity is an option which 
could also guide an exercise under generational accounts.  
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5.  Conclusions and outlines for further work 
In this paper, having first reviewed the previous work in the field of sustainability of public 
finance, we present a rule for gradual adjustment of the tax rate to meet the rising public 
pension and some other ageing-related expenditure in a financially sustainable way, 
respecting intergenerational fairness. While other options exist which could meet the 
requirement of financial sustainability, the criterion of intergenerational fairness helps to 
highlight the key factors which should enter a meaningful discussion on policy options.  
The main result is a time path for a budget balance that gradually reaches 2% of GDP for 
EU-12, and declines thereafter. Debt reduction is about 40% in the fist 15 years and 70% 
until the total adjustment.  
As for policy options stemming from the present framework, an increase in the tax rate 
could always be replaced by a decline in non-ageing-related expenditure. The advantage of 
the framework presented here is that it can incorporate either an instantaneous or gradual 
change in fiscal policy, reflecting any considerations behind them. Preferring a decline of 
non-ageing-related expenditure rather than an increase in taxes could be motivated by an 
attempt to avoid the various negative effects of a tax increase. However, as in previous 
studies in this research line, this policy choice is not treated here, notably because it does 
not affect the outcome for budget balance and debt reduction.  
Furthermore, it is an important result that under the conventional assumptions followed 
here the result for debt reduction does not depend on the level of initial debt, and that the 
budget surplus should be the higher the lower the initial debt. This result, which readily 
follows from the assumptions, could challenge the complacency in countries where initial 
debt is low (or even negative for the net debt), but ageing-related expenditure is yet 
projected to increase markedly.  
The present paper does not cover the results for individual Member States, but as we know 
that there are big differences between them with regard to the projected increase in ageing-
related public expenditure, it is evident that the results for budget balance and debt 
reduction would differ markedly too.  
The importance of these results for policy-making motivates further work in four main 
respects. 
Firstly, now that a case has been made for the link between the long-term expenditure 
projections and the medium-term budget targets, one should carefully verify how well the 
former capture the effects of the prevailing rules for expenditure under projected 
population ageing. This is a major undertaking, and not just a mechanical calculation 
exercise as the systems are complicated, and even more importantly, as there are many grey 
areas, lacking clear rules for possible new situations. For example, a view has to be taken 
on the most likely outcome if pensions are formally set in nominal values or indexed to 
prices, but discrete decisions are occasionally taken to make them follow real wages. The 
projections should be specified for a manageable set of carefully chosen assumptions. The 
projections should change with changes in policy, indicating a reward for an acceptance of 
reforms. Frequent revisions stemming from reassessments of the effects of other factors 
could blur the arguments at important stages of the pension reform process.  
Secondly, the underlying demographic projections should be verified. From the point of 
view of the present method, this is not a major task as it is not decisive whether or not the  
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future  fertility rates underlying the projection are realistic. Here, as the principle of 
intergenerational fairness drives the results, the relevant question is what the current level 
of fertility implies for the future. If and when fertility changes, the expenditure projection 
will also change, thereby leading to a revision in the target for budget balance and debt 
reduction. However, we might need to verify whether the projections to 2050 already 
contain a good enough approximation of the implications of the current fertility rate.  
For longevity it is comforting that a projection up to 2050 is sufficient, as life expectancy 
projected for 2050 determines the target for the tax rate for 2020. Thus, anything that might 
happen to longevity after 2050 will affect the fiscal variables only after 2020, which gives 
ample time for adjusting the fiscal parameters as required. Apart from this, any revisions to 
projections to 2050 should be taken into account as they become available. 
Taking these demographic factors together, the proposed method provides a framework for 
entering their possible revisions into the determination of medium-term fiscal targets. 
Given the pace of possible change, it would be quite sufficient to make the revisions in 5-
10 year intervals. 
Thirdly, applying the method, based on intergenerational fairness, should not be limited to 
only depicting the most likely outcome of the prevailing rules. The nature of the exercise is 
such that the projections for public debt and budget balance are conditional. The outcomes 
for budget balance and debt reduction should be understood as targets if the underlying 
(and once again verified) projections are accepted as targets for expenditure or if no 
policies to deviate from these projections are designed. Correspondingly, the method can be 
extended to options for pension reforms and possibly to changes in other relevant 
provisions, generating alternative projections for expenditure and corresponding paths for 
budget balance and debt reduction. Thus, the framework can be used to discuss pension 
reforms and other policies to contain the increase in ageing-related expenditure, with a 
view to clarifying the effect of these reforms on public finance targets. 
Fourthly, if an important part of the public pension system is privatised by diverting part of 
pension contributions to a private-sector managed fund, a major change in public sector 
revenue and expenditure takes place. Typically, the immediate effect is a decrease in 
revenue, while public pension expenditure declines only much later when public pensions 
decrease as they will be topped up by pensions paid by the privately managed funds. Under 
pension reforms, these short-, medium- and long-term effects need to be clearly identified 
and estimated to arrive at consistent fiscal targets. This is omitted from the present paper as 
the Member States were not undertaking such major reforms at the time of making the EPC 
projections. 
      * * * * * * * 
If and when the long-term expenditure projections are used in setting medium-term fiscal 
targets, their accuracy becomes a much more serious issue than if they are only used to 
discuss expenditure trends without clear and quantified implications for their medium term 
effects. The various deficiencies of the data should not, however, be used as an excuse to 
postpone action. The main message is already known, that under current policies, even if 
optimistically interpreted, ageing-related expenditures are growing considerably in most 
countries. The method presented here provides a framework for a policy discussion on 
setting the medium term budget balance targets to a rising trend, which can then be revised 
downwards as reforms to contain the increase in these expenditures are implemented.  
25 
Annex   
Derivation of the result for the effect of the level of initial debt 
The result that the level of initial (net) public debt does not affect its reduction, discussed 
and illustrated in Chapter 3, can be analytically endorsed with a simplified analysis of a 
public Defined Benefit pension system. Pension expenditure, the fair pension contribution 
rate and pre-funding derived below can be interpreted as ageing-related expenditure, the 
fair tax rate, and reduction in public debt, respectively. The concepts could be re-phrased in 
these terms but this would not affect the results. 
The population is composed of children (E), workers (L) and retirees (R). Each of these 
phases of an individual’s life is, for the purpose of managing the mathematics, set to be of 
equal length, which is set as the unit period: 
(1)   2 1 + + = = t t t R L E . 
To make a rough comparison with real life, the unit period is best considered to last 30 
years as this is currently the average childbearing age of women. 
Parameter f expresses the number of children per worker (on a steady path population then 
decreases at a rate of 1-f): 
(2)   t t t L f E = . 
The workers pay pension contributions and are paid earning-related pensions, determined 
as a fraction pt of the wage rate in the next period as they have retired. This parameter can 
be interpreted to capture both the replacement rate proper and the time spent on retirement, 
which is in reality normally shorter than the time at work; given the replacement rate 
proper, an expected increase in the longevity of workers in each period increases the value 
of parameter pt for that period. The wage rate is taken as the unit of account, allowing for 
any movements of the wage rate, so that the results are solely driven by demographic 
dynamics, the rules of the pension system and the interest rate. The contribution rate is ct. 
To construct a case which is more general than a pure PAYG system, we allow that the 
system owns financial reserves amounting to qt as a percentage of the wage bill. The rate of 
return on all assets, also measured in wage units, is assumed to be uniform and at least 
equal to the rate of growth of the wage bill the rate. The interest factor is noted as ρt, i.e. ρt-
1 is the rate of interest. 
To derive results for population ageing caused by a decline in fertility, fertility is assumed 
to decline in period 1 to fn and then stay at this new level. Subscript n stands for the new 
value of the parameter after the change. Period 1 starts a transition, and period 2 is also 
transitional as the number of retirees is still determined by the previous fertility level. 
Period 3 is the first period of the new steady state, where the population declines at the new 
rate of (1-fn).  
If we first assume that the pension accrual rate and longevity are constant, we note that 
pension expenditure is the same as it was before the decline in fertility, not only in period 1 
but also in period 2. However, in period 2, when the first generation of adults with the 
declined fertility have retired, the wage bill is lower as the number of workers is smaller. 
Therefore, if there has been no adjustment to the pension system, the contribution rate has 
to be increased to a new level, which will then be required in all subsequent periods.   
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The question of fairness arises. Why should the generation of workers in period 1 which 
initiated the decline in fertility, escape the increase in the pension contribution rate to be 
encountered by all future generations? According to the principle that all generations with 
the same demographic characteristics should be treated equally, the answer is negative, 
calling for an increase in the contribution rate already in period 1 for the first generation 
with lower fertility, so that they should pay the same percentage of wages in pension 
contributions as any succeeding generation. Thus, in period 1, revenue should exceed 
expenditure, thereby creating a fund. Thanks to the proceeds from the fund, the 
contributions paid by all future generations are lower than in a pure PAYG system. This 
principle, leading to a permanent fund which covers part of the future pensions, was first 
outlined by Sinn (2000) and further developed by Oksanen (2001 and 2002). 
The analysis can also include a permanent increase in longevity, starting with the workers 
in period 1. Assuming a constant retirement age and replacement rate proper, this leads to a 
permanently higher value for parameter pn. For the sake of fairness, this increase needs to 
be already anticipated in setting the contribution rate in period 1, so that the workers in 
period 1 pay into the system according to their own future longevity.  
The new contribution rate can be derived from the budget balance equations for period 1 
and from period 2 onwards, which read as follows: 
(3)   0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 ) 1 ( L q L q R p L q L c n n − + = − + ρ , and 
(4)   ) ( ) 1 ( 0 1 1 L L q R p L q L c n t n t n n t n − + = − + − ρ . 
From these equations we obtain for the new contribution rate 
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and for the degree of funding  
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While these two expressions give the result for the general case where nothing particular is 
assumed about the interest rate, we can insert a conventional assumption, backed by 
elementary growth theory, and followed in the scenarios in this paper, that the interest rate 
follows the growth rate of the economy exceeding it by a constant margin. Noting that in 
the simplified analysis here the level of production is determined by the size of the labour 








ρ = . 
Note that applying (7) for period 1 as well, means that the decline in the interest rate is 
already anticipated in period 1, although labour force and production are still determined by 
the previous fertility level. 
The equations for the new contribution rate and the change in the degree of funding in this 
case give:  
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The latter equation is written in such a way as to show that under this assumption on the 
interest rate the change in the degree of funding does not depend on its initial level. As 
there is nothing in the formulas above that would prevent the initial degree of funding, q0, 
from being negative, the result for the increase in the degree of funding can be interpreted 
as the reduction of net public debt. Thus, the result that the reduction in public does not 
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